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LIABILITIES OF AN OWNER UNDER
THE SCAFFOLD ACT-THE STATUTE'S
"HAVING CHARGE OF" LANGUAGE PRODUCES
INCONSISTENCY-NORTON v. WAGGONER
EQUIPMENT RENTAL & EXCAVATING CO.*
For the purpose of enhancing the safety of workers in the construction
industry, in 1907 the Illinois Legislature enacted the Structural Work Act,'
commonly called the Scaffold Act. To effectuate this purpose, the Illinois
Legislature worded the statute so as to impose liability upon any owner,
contractor, architect or other person "having charge of" the construction
who willflly 2 violates the statute's terms. During the past three decades the
Illinois Supreme Court has wrestled with the proper interpretation of the
liability-imposing "having charge of" language. Norton v. Waggoner Equipment Rental and Excavating Co. 3 is the court's most recent expression of an
owner's liability under the Scaffold Act. After rehearing and over a vigorous
dissent, the Illinois Supreme Court applied a liberal construction of the Scaffold Act's "having charge of" language and found a school district as owner
liable for violation of the Act.

* This casenote is dedicated to the memory of Jack B. Anger.
1. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 60-69 (1977). The Scaffold Act requires that all scaffolding or
other mechanical contrivances used in construction projects must be built in a safe manner and
constructed to provide adequate protection for those working on the construction site. Id. § 60.
Section 69 of the Act, which determines liability states:
Any owner, contractor, sub-contractor, foreman or other person having charge of
the erection, construction, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any building,
bridge, viaduct or other structure within the provisions of this act, shall comply
with all the terms thereof ....
For any injury to person or property, occasioned by any willful violations of this
act, or willful failure to comply with any of its provisions, a right of action shall
accrue to the party injured, for any direct damages sustained thereby ....
The full title of The Structural Work Act, which reflects the Act's purpose, is: "An act providing for the protection and safety of persons in and about the construction, repairing, alteration
or removal of buildings, bridges, viaducts, and other structures and to provide for the enforcement thereof." Purpose statement, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 60 (1907).
2. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 69 (1977). In Structural Work Act cases the Illinois Supreme
Court has defined "willful" as "knowing." The supreme court has further construed this to mean
actual or constructive knowledge. See Davis v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 61 111. 2d 494, 501,
336 N.E.2d 881, 885 (1975) (defendant is held to know that which he or she reasonably should
have known); Juliano v. Oravec, 53 I11.
2d 566, 571, 293 N.E.2d 897, 900 (1973) (defendant is
deemed to know that which he or she reasonably should have known, which includes the applicable statutory requirements); Schultz v. Henry Ericsson Co., 264 Ill.
156, 166, 106 N.E. 236,
240 (1941) (defendant "is liable not only when the dangerous conditions are known to him, but
also when by the exercise of reasonable care the existence of such dangerous conditions could
have been discovered and known to him").
3. 76 I11.
2d 481, 394 N.E.2d 403 (1979).
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In its opinions the Illinois Supreme Court often has reiterated its belief
that the Scaffold Act should be construed liberally to effectuate the statute's
purpose. 4 Nevertheless, throughout the history of the Act, the supreme
court has rendered both liberal and conservative interpretations of the statute's "having charge of" language, which determines an owner's civil liability 5 under the Structural Work Act. 6 Just four years ago, in McGovern v.
Standish, 7 the Illinois Supreme Court espoused a narrow construction of the
term "having charge of" in section 69.8 Faced with a factual situation similar to that of McGovern, the supreme court now has reached an opposite
result in Norton.
This Note traces the Illinois Supreme Court's construction of the Scaffold
Act's "having charge of" language. The court's decision in Norton is analyzed
and the shortcomings of its reasoning are disclosed. In addition, the Norton
decision's impact on Structural Work Act law is examined. It is concluded
that to resolve the present confusion evident in judicial construction of the
Act's crucial language, legislative revision of the statute is appropriate. Because legislative action is unlikely, an alternative interpretation of the present "having charge of" language is discussed.
THE FACTS OF NORTON

Irwin Norton, an employee of the general contractor, 9 was injured while
working on the construction of a new school building for the Collinsville
School District. '° At the time of the injury, Norton was releasing bundles

4. E.g., Davis v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 61 Ill. 2d at 501, 336 N.E.2d at 885 (statutory requirement of willful violation construed to encompass knowing violation); Halberstadt v.
Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 55 I11.2d 121, 127-28, 302 N.E.2d 64, 67-68 (1973) (washing windows
is qualitatively comparable to repairing or painting a structure, therefore window washers fall
within the scope of the Act); Louis v. Barenfanger, 39 I11. 2d 445, 449, 236 N.E.2d 724, 726
(1968) (failure to provide a scaffold is actionable under the statute).
5. In addition to providing civil remedies, the Scaffold Act is also penal in nature. Section
69 of the Act provides that any person in charge of the construction who willfully violates any of
the statute's provisions is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 69 (1977).
Historically the Act's penal section has been seldom, if ever, used. As a result, the criminal
provision of the Structural Work Act has never been at issue in the Illinois Appellate Court. See
Comment, The Illinois Structural Work Act, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 393, 416 [hereinafter cited as
Comment].
6. See notes 32-54 and accompanying text infra.
7. 65 111.2d 54, 357 N.E.2d 1134 (1976).
8. For an explanation of McGovern's narrow construction of the Act, see notes 45-49 and
accompanying text infra.
9. Waggoner Equipment Rental & Excavating Co. was the general contractor on the project.
10. A more complete summary of the facts is found in the appellate court's decision. Norton
.v. Waggoner Equip. Rental & Excavating Co., 52 11. App. 3d 442, 443-44, 367 N.E.2d 516,
517 (5th Dist. 1977).
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of roofing material from bar joists located at the top of the building. 11 Because no scaffolding was near the bar joists, 12 Norton would crawl onto the
bar joists when releasing the bundles of roofing material. Norton was injured
when the crane operator, acting on relay signals, accidentally lowered a hook
and a "headache ball," which were attached to the crane, onto Norton's
back. 13
William Delaney, "clerk of works" for the construction, handled the project on behalf of the school district. According to trial testimony,1 4 Delaney
was to make sure that the contractors' work met all the contract specifications. He recorded the progress of the construction, inspected the construction, and acted as a liaison between the architect and general contractors.
Delaney had an office at the construction site where he was present for a
short time each day. He held weekly meetings with the contractor, architect, and subcontractor, and any changes that Delaney felt were necessary
had to be reported to the architect. Delaney had neither the power to stop
the work immediately if it was not conforming to the contract nor the power
to terminate the employment of any of the workers on the project. 15
The contract between the school district and contractor placed upon the
contractor the responsibility for the safety of the construction work and the
appointment of a safety superintendent. 16 The contract imparted to the
11. Id. A crane was used to lift bundles of roofing materials to the bar joists located at the
top of the building. The bundles were attached to the crane by hoisting straps that were looped
around a 8" to 10' hook located immediately beneath a steel headache ball. Norton would
release the bundles from the hoisting straps to allow the bundles to fall to the ground. Id.
12. Id. The bar joists were the only surface that Norton could stand on when releasing the
bundles from the hoisting straps and throwing them to the ground. Each joist was about three
to four inches in width and ran the entire length of the building spaced three and one-half to
four feet apart from each other. Id.
13. As a result of the mishap, Norton, in 1971, underwent a spinal operation. During the
next year Norton was readmitted to the hospital after aggravating his back condition through
other mishaps at work. Id.
14. A summary of the testimony of William Delaney and Jack Olsen (the representative of
the architect) is set out in the supreme court opinion, 76 Il. 2d at 488-87, 394 N.E.2d 405-06,
and the appellate court decision, 52 111.App. 3d 442, 446-47, 367 N.E.2d 516, 519-20 (1977).
15. 76 111.2d at 486-87, 394 N.E.2d at 405.
16. Id. at 495-96, 394 N.E.2d at 410 (Ryan, J., dissenting). The contractor agreed to comply
with the construction industry's standard safety manual. The following is the applicable section
of the contract:
The Contractor alone shall be responsible for the safety, efficiency, and adequacy of
his plant, appliances, and methods, and for any damage which may result from their
failure or their improper construction maintenance, or operation.'
'The Contractor shall employ methods of construction or erection, and hoists, rigging, forms, scaffolding . . . etc., at the site of the work which satisfy or exceed the
requirements of . . . State and Federal safety laws, and building codes, including
but not limited to the 'Structural Work Act'. ... '
'The Contractor shall designate a responsible representative at the job site as a
Safety Superintendent who shall be responsible for the promotion of safety and
prevention of accidents. . ..
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school district-owner the right to access and inspection of the work, as well
as the delayed right to terminate the work if the contractor committed contract violations. 17 In addition, the owner's written approval was required
before changes could be made in the work, and the owner could also order
extra work or require work to be redone. 18
In order to recover damages for the injuries he sustained, Norton sued the
owner, 19 the architect, 20 and the general contractor 2 for violations of the
Structural Work Act. 22 During the trial the suits against the architect and
general contractor were dismissed without prejudice by the plaintiff. 23 A
jury trial in the Circuit Court of Madison County awarded plaintiff a verdict
of $175,000 on the grounds that the school district, as owner, was liable
under the Act as a person having charge of the construction. 24
The Fifth District of the Appellate Court of Illinois reversed the verdict and
judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 25 The court reasoned that holding the
school district accountable for Norton's injury would be imposing liability by
virtue of mere ownership. 26 Thus, the court ruled that because the defendant was not in charge of the construction activity that resulted in Norton's
injury, judgment n.o.v. for the defendant was appropriate.27 The Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed this result, 28 but later reversed after granting the

plaintiff a rehearing. 29
In reversing the judgment of the appellate court, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the school district was sufficiently in charge of the construc-

17. Id. at 496, 394 N.E.2d at 410.
18. Id. In its petition for rehearing, the school district disputed the majority's contention
that the owner had the contractual authority to order changes in the work. See note 73 and
accompanying text infra.
19. The owner was Collinsville Community Unit District No. 10.
20. Architectural Associates Inc. was the architectural firm that drafted plans and specifications for the construction.
21. The general contractor was Waggoner Equipment Rental & Excavating Co.
22. 76 Ill. 2d at 484, 394 N.E.2d at 404. Plaintiff contended that the school district violated
the Act by failing to provide scaffolding when, under the circumstances, scaffolding was necessary to protect workers from injury. "The implication from the evidence being that if a supporting device had been provided, the plaintiff would not have had to climb onto the load to
remove the strap and accordingly would not have exposed himself to the risk of injury from the
crane's ball." Norton v. Waggoner Equip. Rental & Excavating Co., 52 I11.
App. 3d at 444, 367
N.E.2d at 517.
23. 76 Ill. 2d at 484, 394 N.E.2d at 404.
24. Id.
25. Norton v. Waggoner Equip. Rental & Excavating Co., 52 Ill.
App. 3d 442, 367 N.E.2d
516 (5th Dist. 1977).
26. Id. at 448, 367 N.E.2d at 520. See Gannon v. Chicago, Milwaukee St. Paul & Pac. Ry.
Co., 22 Ill. 2d 305, 321, 175 N.E.2d 785, 793 (1961) (establishing the rule that mere ownership
of the premises is insufficient to establish liability under the Scaffold Act).
27. 52 Ill. App. 3d at 447-48, 367 N.E.2d at 520.
28. Norton v. Waggoner Equip. Rental & Excavating Co., Docket No. 50066 (Sup. Ct. 111.
Dec. 6, 1978).
29. 76 II1. 2d 481, 394 N.E.2d 403 (1979).
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tion to be held responsible for violations of the Structural Work Act. The
Norton majority noted that the defendant exercised more than mere ownership powers over the construction, and thus the question of who had charge
of the work was a factual issue for the jury to determine. 30 The court
reasoned that the evidence demonstrated sufficient retention of supervision
and control of the construction by the school district to justify a finding of
liability. 31
PRE-NORTON ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATIONS
OF THE "HAVING CHARGE OF" LANGUAGE

Divergent Illinois Supreme Court interpretations have articulated a presently confused definition of the Scaffold Act's "having charge of" language.
This confusion has evolved from vague and sometimes inconsistent reasoning
set forth in supreme court opinions over the past three decades. While the
wording of the statute has remained virtually unchanged, the Illinois Supreme Court has continually restricted and expanded the scope of liability
under the Act. Thus, the supreme court has been unsuccessful in rendering
a workable interpretation of the nebulous "having charge of" wording.
The first Illinois Supreme Court case to consider an owner's liability under
section 69 of the Scaffold Act was Kennerly v. Shell Oil Co. 32 In Kennerly,
the court impliedly held that all owners who willfully violate the Act are
liable per se regardless of whether or not the owner is in charge of the
construction. 3 Three years later, in Cannon v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St.
30. Id. at 491-92, 394 N.E.2d at 408.
31. Id. at 491, 394 N.E.2d at 408.
32. 13 I11.2d 431, 150 N.E.2d 134 (1958). In this case, the plaintiff was injured when he fell
from a scaffold while welding a waterline. The scaffold was built by employees of plaintiff's
employer, Foster Wheeler Corporation, an independent contractor on the construction project.
The injured employee was able to recover against the owner of the construction for the owners
willful violations of the Structural Work Act. Id. at 433, 150 N.E.2d at 136. For a good discussion of Kennerly, see Strodel, Illinois Scaffold Act Liability, 50 ILL. B.J. 1092, 1093-95 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Strodel I].
Two districts of the Illinois Appellate Court had decided the issue of an owner's liability
under § 69 of the Structural Work Act prior to the Kennerly decision. Both courts held that an
owner must be in charge of the construction before liability can be imposed for violation of the
Act. Taber v. Defenbaugh, 9 II1. App. 2d 169, 132 N.E.2d 454 (3d Dist. 1956); Brenton v.
Levinson, 207 Il. App. 406 (1st Dist. 1917).
33. The Kennerly court never expressly stated that an owner is liable per se under
the Act. The supreme court, however, by failing to require that the owner be in charge of
the construction before imposing liability, effectively created a nondelegable duty upon the
owner with its holding. To support its construction, the Kennerly court relied on language from
the first Illinois case decided under the Structural Work Act, Claffy v. Chicago Dock & Canal
Co., 249 I11. 210, aff'd 228 U.S. 680 (1911). As the Kennerly court perceived it, the Claffy
court interpreted § 67 of the Scaffold Act as imposing an absolute duty upon the owner to
comply with this section of the Act. Kennerly v. Shell Oil Co., 13 I11.2d at 434, 150 N.E.2d at
136. Section 67 of the Scaffold Act, however, is absent the "in charge of" language that is found
in section 69. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 67 (1977). Thus, because plaintiff's suit in Claffy
concerned § 67 violations of the Scaffold Act, the Claffy opinion is improper precedent for
actions based upon § 69.
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Paul & Pacific Railroad,34 the Illinois Supreme Court reached a more restrictive result concerning an owner's liability under section 69. The Gannon
court unequivocally rejected the notion that an owner is liable for a willful
violation of the Act irrespective of control and held that section 69 of the
Scaffold Act does not create nondelegable duties; according to Gannon, only
those who are in charge of the construction work can be held liable under
section 69.35 The court stated that liability under section 69 could only be
imposed for willful violations, which Under the Scaffold Act means knowing
violations. 36 In addition, the court stated that willful violations could be
perpetrated only by persons directly connected with the operation, and not
by those who merely own the premises. 37
The Supreme Court next liberalized the Gannon reading of "having
charge of" in Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 3 emphasizing that a
liberal construction of the term "having charge of" is necessary to ensure
that the Act's purpose be effectuated. 39 The Larson court expressly rejected the trial court's jury instruction requiring proof of retention of supervision and control before the defendant-owner could be deemed in charge of
the construction. The court reasoned that the definition of "having charge of"
may include supervision and control, but that "having charge of," although
requiring a direct relation to the work, is not limited to supervision and
control. 40 The Larson court cryptically stated that "[t]he term 'having
charge of' is one of common usage and understanding and it is our opinion
'
that firther attempt[s] at definition can only lead to confusion and error. "41
34. 22 111.2d 305, 175 N.E.2d 785 (1961).
35. Id. at 319-20, 175 N.E.2d at 792-93. The court agreed with the Kennerly opinion that
the Act's purpose is to reduce the hazards of construction to the utmost extent, but stated, "the
recognition of this purpose cannot justify deleting unambiguous words from the statute." Id. at
322, 175 N.E.2d at 794. The court was referring to the words "having charge of" in § 69. See
Warren v. Meeker, 55 I11.
2d 108, 111, 302 N.E.2d 54, 56 (1973); Kiszkar v. Texas Co., 22 I11.
2d 326, 329, 175 N.E.2d 401, 402 (1961).
36. 22 I11.
2d at 321, 175 N.E.2d at 793. A willful or knowing violation presumes a connection with work beyond mere ownership. Id. See Note, Property Owner Liable Under Illinois
Scaffold Act Only if He Is Person "Having Charge," 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 745, 749. The author
states that Gannon provides a justifiable limitation on the Scaffold Act, and that a nondelegable
interpretation of the Act distorts the plain meaning of willful under the Act. See note 2 supra.
37. 22 I11.
2d at 321, 175 N.E.2d at 793.
38. 33 I11.
2d 316, 211 N.E.2d 247 (1965). Plaintiff sued Commonwealth Edison, the owner
of the construction, for injuries he received when the scaffold on which he was working broke.
The jury returned a verdict for Commonwealth Edison, maintaining that the owner was not in
charge. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded the jury verdict, holding as erroneous a jury instruction that required proof of retention of supervision and control of the work
before determining that the owner was "in charge of" the construction.
39. Id. at 321-22, 211 N.E.2d at 251. The Larson court liberalized the result in Gannon by
not requiring proof of supervision and control as a prerequisite to a determination that one is in
charge of the work. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
40. 33 Ill. 2d at 321-22, 211 N.E.2d at 251.
41. Id. at 323, 211 N.E.2d at 252. The court, however, reiterated the Gannon holding,
noting that "an owner must have some direct connection with the operations, over and above
mere ownership or the employment of an independent contractor." Id.at 321-22, 211 N.E.2d at
251.
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Thus, while the effect of the Gannon decision was to absolve many owners
from liability tinder section 69 actions, 42 the Larson opinion, by liberalizing
the interpretation of the "having charge of" language made owners much
more susceptible to liability. a

Almost a decade later, in Carruthers v. B.C. Christopher & Co. 44 and
McGovern v. Standish,4 5 the Illinois Supreme Court again restricted the
scope of an owner's liability under the Scaffold Act. In both cases, in addition to requiring a direct connection with the work, the court held that "an
owner is not liable under the Scaffold Act unless he had charge of the particular operation which was a violation of the Act and caused the injury." 6
Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court has reaffirmed the holding that a
person must be in charge of the particular operation before liability may be
imposed under the Act. 47 The addition of the word "particular" to the
42. See Melvin v. Thompson, 39 I11.
App. 2d 413, 188 N.E.2d 497 (lst Dist. 1963) (owner's
action of inspecting the work and threatening to stop the work if it was being done improperly
was only an effort to insure contract compliance; thus, reasonable men could not consider the
owner to be in charge of the work as required for liability to arise under the Scaffold Act);
Loveless v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 40 I1l. App. 2d 347, 189 N.E.2d 679 (3d Dist. 1963)
(defendant's right to stop the work if a statutory violation was taking place by the contractor was
insufficient to hold that the owner was in charge of the work); Kobus v. Formfit Co., 56 I1.
App. 2d 449, 206 N.E.2d 477 (1st Dist. 1965), rev'd, 35 I11.
2d 533, 221 N.E.2d 633 (1966)
(appellate court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the owner). After the Larson decision,
Kobus was reviewed by the supreme court, which reversed and remanded the appellate court
decision. The supreme court held that there was a question of fact as to whether defendant
owner was in charge of the work and that summary judgment in favor of the owner therefore
was improper. Kobus v. Formfit Co., 35 111.
2d 533, 221 N.E.2d 633 (1966). For a discussion of
these three cases, see Strodel, The Illinois Scaffold Act in Perspective, 54 ILL. B.J. 624, 62528 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Strodel 11].
43. See Comment, supra note 5, at 403. See, e.g., Kobus v. Formfit Co., 35 I11.
2d 533, 221
N.E.2d 633 (1.966) (supreme court reversed summary judgment in favor of the owner because
question of fact existed as to whether owner was in charge of the construction where owner had
contractual right to inspect and order changes in the work); Carlson v. Metropolitan Sanitary
Dist., 64 I11.
App. 2d 331, 213 N.E.2d 129 (1st Dist. 1965) (owner held to be "in charge of" the
work where owner retained right to control manner and method of work but did not control
minutiae of detail involved in the construction).
With respect to owners in possession of the premises, the supreme court never implemented
the rtle that normal indices of ownership are insufficient to uphold liability tinder the Scaffold
Act. Comment, supra note 5, at 405. The supreme court, however, upheld a summary judgment in favor of an owner who was not in possession of the premises at the time of the accident
in Warren v. Meeker, 55 I11.
2d 108, 302 N.E.2d 54 (1973).
44. 57 I11.
2d 376, 313 N.E.2d 457 (1974) (plaintiff sued defendant, who leased and operated
a grain elevator on the property on which plaintiff was injured, for violation of Scaffold Act).
45. 65 I11.
2d 54, 357 N.E.2d 1134 (1976) (injured plaintiff sued architect on construction
project for violation of the Structural Work Act).
46. Carruthers v. B.C. Christopher & Co., 57 Ill. 2d at 378, 313 N.E.2d at 458-59 (emphasis added); McGovern v. Standish, 65 Il1. 2d at 67, 357 N.E.2d at 1141. Compare the
language used in Warren v. Meeker, 55 Il.2d at 111, 302 N.E.2d at 56 (1973), which both
Carruthersand McGovern relied on for support of their holding: -[T]o establish liability tinder
the Act an owner or other person must have been in charge of the operation which involved the
violation from which the injury arises."
47. See, e.g., Norton v. Waggoner Equip. Rental & Excavating Co., 76 I11.
2d at 489-90,
394 N.E.2d at 407; Crothers v. LaSalle Inst., 68 I11.
2d 399, 370 N.E.2d 213 (1977).
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"having charge of" language had been subject, however, to the criticism that
such an interpretation defeated the purpose of the Act and shielded owners
and architects from liability. 4' It was noted that while an owner may be in
charge of the overall construction, he or she usually does not supervise the
particular operation from which the injury arose.49 These critics have noted
that the employee's employer is usually the person directly in charge of the
particular operation that caused the injury .50 Because the exclusive remedies clause of the Workmen's Compensation Act 5 1 precludes an employee
from suing his or her employer, the employee is left with statutory compensation as the sole remedy for injuries sustained on the job.
The Illinois Supreme Court responded to such criticism by clarifying the
holding of McGovern in Emberton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 5 2 The court stated that McGovern correctly states the law if
McGovern was intended to mean that a person may be determined to be "in
charge of" the particular operation that was the violation of the Act and
caused the injury "either by proof that he exercised control, or that the right
to control the work existed whether exercised or not ... ."53 The Einberton
court, in finding the defendant liable under the Act, also expressly rejected
the contention that the evidence must prove that the defendant had the

2d at 413-19, 370
48. In his concurring opinion in Crothers v. LaSalle Inst., 68 I11.
N.E.2d at 220-23, Justice Dooley emphatically objected to the McGovern court's interpretation
of the statutory words "incharge of." Justice Dooley complained that such an interpretation
violates the principle that more than one person can be in charge of the work. He quoted the
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions to support his argument:
Under the statute I have just read to you, it is possible for more than one person to
"have charge of" the work. One or more persons can have charge of the overall
work, and other persons can have charge of the phase of the work in connection
with which an injury occurs. In that event, all of them would "have charge of" the
work within the meaning of the statute.
Who had charge of the work tinder the particular facts of this case is for you to
decide.
Id. at 417-18, 370 N.E.2d at 222 (Dooley, J., concurring), quoting ILLINOIS PA'TTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 180.02 (2d ed. 1971). See Ring, The Scaffold Act: Its Past, Present and Future,
64 ILL. B.J. 666, 679-80 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Ring].
49. Crothers v. LaSalle Inst., 68 II1. 2d at 418, 370 N.E.2d at 222 (Dooley, J., concurring).
See Ring, supra note 48, at 680 n.94, where the author states, "indeed, only in the most major
of construction projects is the owner directly involved in the construction activities"; Note, The
Problem of Liability Under the Structural Work Act, 10 DEPAUL L. REV. 145, 150 (1960)
(author favors a nondelegable owner's duty because the owner is in control of the construction
in relatively few cases).
50. See Crothers v. LaSalle Inst., 68 Il.2d 418-19, 370 N.E.2d at 222-23; Comment,
supra note 7, at 417.
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 138.5, § 5(a) (1977).
52. 71 II. 2d 111, 373 N.E.2d 1348 (1978). Plaintiff, who was injured while moving a
portable scaffold during the construction, sued the owner for violation of the Scaffold Act. The
supreme court held that the evidence supported the jury finding that the owner was "in charge
of" the work.
53. Id. at 119, 373 N.E.2d at 1351.
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right to control or direct the manner or methods in which the construction
would be accomplished. 54
ANALYSIS

OF NORTON

55

Upon first review of Norton,
a majority of the Illinois Supreme Court
found that the school district's degree of involvement in construction was
insufficient to create a question of fact concerning whether it was "in charge
of" the work. The court reasoned that the owner must have been in a posi-

tion to protect the workmen from dangerous conditions before liability could
be imposed. 56 The court noted that the school district's delayed right to
stop the work was "not the type of retained authority which an owner must
have to prevent injury to the workers or to protect them from hazardous
construction practices."

57

The supreme court ultimately concluded that the

school district possessed no more than normal ownership rights over the
work and to impose liability upon the school district would not further the
purpose of the Act. 58
After rehearing Norton, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed its earlier
decision. 59 The new Norton majority emphasized that the issue of "having
charge of" is one of fact. Thus, to overturn the jury verdict in favor of Norton,

the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, must
so overwhelmingly favor the school district that no contrary verdict based on
that evidence could ever stand. 60 In its reasoning, the court followed the
familiar guidelines established in Gannon v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul &
Pacific Railroad6' and Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co. 62 for determin-

54. Id. at 118-19, 373 N.E.2d at 1350-51.
55. Docket No. 50066, at 10 (Sup. Ct. Ill., Dec. 8, 1978). The author of the first opinion
was Justice Ryan, who wrote the dissenting opinion after rehearing. See text accompanying
notes 84-96 infra.
56, Id. at 8. The court further stated that the term "having charge of" should in some way
relate to the safety of the construction in order to accomplish the purpose of the Act. Drawing
support from an Oregon court's interpretation of a similar act, the court stated:
In Wilson v. Portland General Electric Co., (1968) 252 Ore. 385, 448 P.2d 562, the
court noted that the purpose of the Oregon act is to provide maximum protection to
the workmen engaged in hazardous occupations. Therefore, before the retained
right of control by an owner should give rise to liability, that retained right of
control should bear some relation to the creator of risk of danger to the workman
resulting from dangerous working conditions.
Id. at 10 [citation omitted].
57. Id. at 11.
58. Id. at 12. The court further stated that ownership alone cannot establish that one is in
charge of the construction. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
59. Norton v. Waggoner Equip. Rental & Excavating Co., 76 II. 2d 481, 394 N.E.2d 403
(1979).
60. 76 Ill. 2d at 485-86, 394 N.E.2d at 405. The court established this rule in Pedrick v.
Peoria & E.R.R., 37 I1. 2d 494, 510, 229 N.E.2d 504, 513-14 (1967).
61. 22 Il. 2d 305, 175 N.E.2d 785 (1968). See notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
62. 33 Ill. 2d 316, 211 N.E.2d 247 (1965). See notes 38-41 and accompanying text supra.
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ing an owner's liability under the Scaffold Act. The court reiterated that
while an owner is not per se liable for willful violations under the Act,
neither is retention of supervision and control of the work by the owner
necessary for a finding of liability. .3
Applying this rule to the facts of Norton, the majority concluded that an
evaluation of the "totality of the circumstances" 6 4a revealed that the school
district retained enough authority and supervision for a jury justifiably to
find that it was in charge of the construction and, therefore, liable for violations of the Scaffold Act. 65 In so holding the court impliedly determined
63. 76 11.2d at 488, 394 N.E.2d at 406. The court then cited the often quoted language of
Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 33 Ill. 2d 316, 321-22, 211 N.E.2d 247, 251 (1965),
defining the parameters of "having charge of":
The term "having charge of" is a generic term of broad import, and although it may
include supervision and control, it is not confined to it. As was said of the word
"charge" in People v. Gould, 345 Ill. 288, 323, [178 N.E. 133, 148 (1931)]: "The
word does not necessarily include custody, control, or restraint, and its meaning
must be determined hy the associations and circumstances surrounding its use. 'To
have charge of' does not necessarily imply more than to care for or to have the care
of.' . .. [C]onsistent with its beneficent purpose of preventing injury to person
employed in the extra-hazardous occupation of structural work, the thrust of the
statute is not confined to those who perform, or supervise, or control, or who retain
the right to supervise and control, the actual work from which the injury arises,
but, to insure maximum protection, is made to extend to owners and others who
have charge of the erection or alteration of any building or structure.
76 I11.2d at 488-89, 394 N.E.2d at 406-07.
64. In McGovern v. Standish, 65 II1. 2d 54, 68, 357 N.E.2d 1134, 1141 (1976), the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the issue of "having charge" must be determined through an assessment of all circumstances. The majority in McGovern distinguished Miller v. DeWitt, 37 II1. 2d
273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967), which appeared to hold that an architect's right to stop the work
established that he was in charge of the construction. The Miller court stated: "We also believe
that what we have heretofore said regarding the architect's right to stop the work if it were
being done in a dangerous manner makes them persons 'having charge' within the meaning of
the Act." Id. at 286, 226 N.E.2d at 639. The McGovern court explained that the language of
Miller has to be considered in terms of the factual setting of that case. Accordingly, the
McGovern court stated, "[i]n Miller we were called upon to determine whether sufficient evidence had been presented to create a jury question on the allegations made by plaintiffs. This
Court found a sufficient quantum of evidence and, in so doing, stressed the right afforded the
defendants to stop the work." 65 Ill. 2d at 68, 357 N.E.2d at 1141. The majority in McGovern
refused to adopt a narrow interpretation of the language in Miller and therefore did not interpret Miller as holding that the right to stop work always establishes that one is in charge of the
work.
65. 76 Ill. 2d at 491, 394 N.E.2d at 408. The Illinois Supreme Court compared Norton with
Voss v. Kingdon & Naven, Inc., 60 IlI. 2d 520, 328 N.E.2d 297 (1975) (owner was held to be in
charge of the construction where he could fire workers and immediately stop the work), and
McGovern v. Standish, 65 IIl. 2d 54, 357 N.E.2d 1134 (architect was held not to be in charge of
the work where he only had rights to supervise, inspect, and terminate the work upon ten days'
notice). The Norton majority found that the school district did not have as much control over
the construction as the owner in Voss. The supreme court then reasoned that the architect's
duties in McGovern were only to insure that the general contractor complied with the contract.
The Norton court deduced that "the school district's authority may not have been as expansive
as in Voss, . . . but it was much more so than this court found in McGovern, where evidence
showed the defendant never exercised control over the work." 76 III. 2d at 489-90, 394 N.E.2d
at 407.
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that the school district's control over the construction went beyond mere
ownership. In support of its conclusion the court noted that the school district made daily inspections of the site.66 Moreover, it possessed the contractual power to have work redone at its direction, and, according to the
record, the school district did have work redone at its direction.67 The
court further stated that because Delaney was experienced in the construction field and was familiar with the bar joists, 68 Delaney should have "either
at his direction or through the architect" remedied the unsafe working conditions. 69
Criticism of the Majority Opinion
The Illinois Supreme Court never expressly addressed its reversal of its
first opinion rendered in Norton. One factor upon which the court apparently relied heavily to support its determination that the school district could
be found to have been "in charge of" the construction was that work allegedly had been redone at Delaney's direction. At three different stages of
the opinion the court reiterated that Delaney was contractually able to and
did order work to be redone. 70 Facially, this argument offers strong support for the conclusion that the school district was "in charge of" the construction. Yet, the court never goes beyond a statement of the fact to an
examination of its significance. The court disposes of the issue in a one sentence paragraph: "[T]estimony by others shows Delaney had significant
supervisory input into the construction, such as having work redone at its
direction." 7 1 For such an important factual point, the court offered little

66. 76 I11.
2d at 491, 394 N.E.2d at 408.
67. Id. at 490-91, 394 N.E.2d at 407-08.
68. By his own admission, Delaney stated that he had been on the bar joists of the construction site 35 to 40 times, and also had been on the bar joists on which plaintiff was injured a few
times. Id. at 486-87, 394 N.E.2d at 405-06.
69. Id. at 491, 394 N.E.2d at 408.
70. id. at 487, 394 N.E.2d at 406 (testimony by others shows Delaney had significant supervisory input into the construction such as having work redone at its direction), id. at 491, 394
N.E.2d at 408 ("the school district . ..could order changes; had to approve changes; ordered,
through Delaney, that certain work had to be redone"), id. at 492, 394 N.E.2d at 408 ("Delaney
daily made inspections and had work redone").
71. id. at 487, 394 N.E.2d at 406. But see Petition for Rehearing for Defendant, where the
school district argues that "only the testimony of Ellsworth Hellman deals with Delaney ordering work to be redone." Mr. Hellman did testify that Mr. Delaney had required an area of
subgrade to be redone; but Mr. Hellman also testified that he had no knowledge concerning
any authority that Mr. Delaney might have had and that Mr. Delaney never gave any labor
crews directions concerning the manner in which work was to be done. Nor did Mr. Hellman
explain any procedure that Mr. Delaney may have followed before the work was redone or
whether the final work order may have come from the architect. In fact, according to Mr.
Olsen's testimony, as a matter of practical interpretation of the contractual provisions involved
in this construction contract, the architect was the only party concerned with this construction
who could have work redone. Petition for Rehearing for Defendant, Norton v. Waggoner
Equip. Rental & Excavating Co., 76 I11.
2d 481, 394 N.E.2d 403 (1979).
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analysis. The Norton majority even failed to mention that the work that De72
laney ordered the general contractor to repeat involved subgrade cement.
In requiring subgrade work to be redone, Delaney was only demanding contract compliance, a right arguably conferred by mere ownership.
The appellate court on the other hand, while recognizing that some concrete work that was substandard was redone at the direction of the architect
and owner, stated that Delaney never "told anyone how or when to perform
any part of the construction work." ' 73 The appellate court implied that the
substandard work that was redone at Delaney's request did not support a
finding that the school district was in charge of the construction. Delaney's
request to the contractor that subgrade work be redone is indeed uncompelling evidence that the school was "in charge of" the construction.
The weakest aspect of the majority opinion in Norton was its treatment of
McGovern. 74 The Norton majority was compelled to analyze McGovern because the McGovern facts closely resembled those of Norton. In its attempt
to distinguish the cases, the supreme court concluded that the school district
in Norton possessed more control over the construction of the new school
than the architect exercised over the construction of a new hospital in
McGovern. 75 The Norton majority attempted to differentiate the undistinguishable however, in its examination of McGovern. Both Delaney-the
clerk of works in Norton-and Standish-the architect in McGovern-were
to observe the construction as it proceeded, to discuss the construction with
the general contractor, and to see generally that the construction met the
specifications of the contract. Further, much of the school district's authority
in Norton was subject to the approval of the architect, 76 whereas the decision of the architect in McGovern was subject to arbitration. 77

72. See 52 t11.
App. 3d at 447, 367 N.E.2d at 520 (5th Dist. 1977).
73. Id. In addition, the appellate court contended that the school district did not possess
any special powers such as the right to fire employees of the contractor working on the construction. Id.
74. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
75. 76 II1. 2d at 490, 394 N.E.2d at 407.
76. See Justice Ryan's dissenting opinion in Norton where he stated:
The contract between the school district and the architect provides that the architect shall make decisions on all claims of the owner (school district) and the
contractor and on all matters relating to the execution and the progress of the work,
or the interpretation of the contract documents .... [Tihe owner shall observe the
procedure of issuing orders to contractors only through the architect, and that if the
owner observes, or becomes aware of any defect in the project, he shall give
prompt written notice thereof to the architect.
76 11. 2d at 493, 394 N.E.2d at 409 (Ryan, J., dissenting). The testimony of the architect, Jack
Olson, in Norton also supported this contention. Olson said, "The clerk would be the first to
know of any deviations and would report them to the architect." Id. at 487, 394 N.E.2d at 406.
77. The contract between the architect and the owner in McGovern under the heading
architect's decisions stated:
(a) It shall be the responsibility of the Architect to make written decisions in
regard to all claims of the Owner or Contractor and to interpret the Contract
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The contractual rights given the school district in Norton paralleled the
contractual authority over the construction given the architect in McGovern.
78
and
The contract in McGovern gave the architect the right to inspect
79
ten
after
the
work
terminate
could
the work. The architect also
supervise
contracby
the
contract
days' notice upon any substantial violation of the
tor. 80 Further, the contract allowed the architect "to reject defective material and workmanship or to require its correction."8' 1 The contract in Norton gave the school district the right to access and inspection of the work.
The school district also was given a delayed right to stop the work for contract violations committed by the general contractor. Finally, all desired
82
changes in the work were subject to the owner's written approval.
Because the school district's authority over the contractor in Norton mirrored the architect's authority in McGovern, the supreme court cannot rationally justify reaching opposite results. If a present majority of the Illinois
Supreme Court supported a more liberal application of the Scaffold Act, it
should have announced that McGovern was too restrictive an interpretation
of the Act and overruled it rather than have distinguished the indistinguishable in order to pay lip service to precedent.
Justice Ryan's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Ryan, in his dissenting opinion, 8 3 contended that liability should
not be imposed under the Scaffold Act unless an owner is in a position to
promote the safety of construction workers on the site. 84 The dissenting
justice concluded that the school district was not in a position to foster the
safety of the construction workers during the building of the new school, and
for this reason could not be in charge of the construction within the meaning
of the Act. The dissenting opinion, by focusing on the issue of whether the

Documents on all questions arising in connection with the execution of the work.
(b) Except as otherwise specified, all the Architect's decisions or interpretations
of contract requirements are subject to arbitration.
65 I11.
2d at 63-64, 357 N.E.2d at 1139.
78. id. at 65, 357 N.E.2d at 1140.
79. Id. at 63, 357 N.E.2d at 1139.
80. Id. at 64, 357 N.E.2d at 1139.
81. Id. at 65, 357 N.E.2d at 1140.
82. For a discussion of the contractual authority given to the school district in Norton, see
notes 20-23 and accompanying text supra.
83. Justice Ryan incorporated his Dec. 6, 1978, supreme court opinion originally rendered
in Norton into his dissent.
84. 76 11.2d at 500-03, 394 N.E.2d at 413-14 (Ryan, J., dissenting). One commentator who
supports such an interpretation has stated that: "This interpretation has the advantage of incorporating a fault standard into the 'having charge' concept. . . . Corporations as large as Commonwealth Edison would still be responsible for accidents during structured projects because of
their presumed expertise in matters of safety." Comment, supra note 5, at 406.
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school district was able to enhance the safety of the workers at the construction site, however, failed to clarify the ambiguous "having charge of" language.
The dissent noted that where the owner has operated as a general contractor on the construction, the supreme court has supported a jury finding that
the owner was in charge of the work. 8" Justice Ryan added that where
large construction projects are involved, and the owner is a large corporation
that maintains a separate department with employees and is involved in the
planning and construction of the company's projects, such owners have been
held to be in charge of the construction. 86 Ryan argued that such owners
are sufficiently involved with the ongoing construction activities to be able to

enhance the safety of the construction workers. 87
Justice Ryan also recognized that the ability to stop the work is an important factor in determining if an owner is in charge of the construction. 88 The
85. 76 11. 2d at 503, 394 N.E.2d at 413-14 (Ryan, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Mclnerney v.
Hasbrook Constr. Co., 62 I11.2d 93, 338 N.E.2d 868 (1975) (owner held to be in charge of the
work where owner acted as general contractor, possessed contractual right to supervise, correct
and alter work, and engaged architect who coordinated the work and selected subcontractors);
Born v. Malloy, 64 Ill. App. 3d 181, 381 N.E.2d 52 (1st Dist. 1978) (summary judgment in
favor of defendant part owner reversed where defendant did not hire general contractor but
instead coordinated and directed the work of various contractors himself).
86. 76 I11.2d at 504, 394 N.E.2d at 414. See, e.g., Emberton v. State Farm Mnt. Auto. Ins.
Co., 71 I11. 2d 111, 373 N.E.2d 1348 (1978) (employees of the owner's building and design
department drafted the preliminary layout work for the construction, worked with the architect
to arrive at a final design, and made frequent inspections of the site); McNellis v. Combustion
Eng'r Inc., 58 I11. 2d 146, 317 N.E.2d 573 (1974) (several employees of the owner, including
five or six engineers, were always present at the site to inspect the work); Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 33 Ill. 2d 316, 211 N.E.2d 247 (1965) (six employees of the owner were
always present at the construction to inspect and insure contract compliance). But see Beebe v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 45 II1. App. 3d 43, 358 N.E.2d 1343 (3d Dist. 1977), and Kirbach
v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 40 Ill. App. 3d 587, 352 N.E.2d 468 (5th Dist. 1976), where
Commonwealth Edison, as owner, was determined not to be in charge of the construction. In
both of these cases the owner had the contractual power to inspect the work, to order unsatisfactory work to be redone, to fire persons working on the construction, and to stop the work if
done in an unsafe or improper manner. In Beebe employees of the owner were never present at
the construction and in Kirbach although the employees were sometimes present at the work
site, they did not perform any detailed inspection of the construction.
87. 76 Ill. 2d at 504, 394 N.E.2d at 414.
88. Id. at 506, 394 N.E.2d at 415. See, e.g., Emberton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
71 11. 2d 111, 373 N.E.2d 1348 (1978) (architect was determined to be in charge where he,
upon his reasonable opinion, possessed contractual authority to order contractor to stop the
work to insure proper performance of the contract); Voss v. Kingdon & Naven, Inc., 60 I11.2d
520, 328 N.E.2d 297 (1975) (owner held to be in charge where contract provided him prerogative to stop the work if, in his opinion, conditions were unfavorable to the proper running of the
construction); McNellis v. Combustion Eng'r Inc., 58 111.2d 146, 317 N.E.2d 573 (1974) (owner
found in charge where his representatives on project could stop work if the construction were
effected in an unsafe manner); Miller v. DeWitt, 37 111.2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967) (architect determined in charge of work where he could suspend work to insure contract compliance). But see, e.g., Kirbach v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 40 I11.App. 3d 587, 352 N.E.2d
468 (5th Dist. 1976) (owner held not to be in charge of the construction even though, under the
contract, the owner could terminate the work if done in an unsafe or improper manner).
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owner with such authority can promote the safety of the workers by stopping
the work when a dangerous condition is noticed. Justice Ryan distinguished,
however, an immediate right to terminate the work from a delayed right to
stop the construction. He noted that the hoisting of the roofing materials
onto the bar joists lasted only a few days. 89 Considering that under the
contract in Norton, unsafe working conditions could continue on the project
for at least ten days after the owner had given notice to the contractor that
safety violations existed, 90 the dissenting justice concluded that the school
district's delayed right to stop the work did not enable the owner to promote
the safety of the workers. 91
To further support the contention that the school district was not "in
charge of" the work, the dissenting opinion stated that the school district,
through the clerk of works and the architect, did not commit itself to the
safety facets of the construction. 92 This argument is unconvincing. The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that the actual participation in a construction
project is not what is important to the issue of liability but rather what
control over the project the owner could have exercised. 93 It is immaterial
that Delaney never had read the contractual provisions pertaining to safety.
Delaney, acting on behalf of the school district, was knowledgeable about
construction methods. He therefore could not plead ignorance as to knowledge of safety procedures to escape liability.
Additionally, Justice Ryan argued that Delaney's function on the project
was mainly to insure that the construction was conforming to the provisions
of the contract. 94 Although Delaney inspected the work, was at the site
daily, and held weekly meetings with the architect and contractor, Justice
Ryan asserted that Delaney's ongoing activities with the construction were
insufficient to influence the safety of the construction. 95 The dissent con89. 76 111.2d at 506, 394 N.E.2d at 415 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
90. Id. Ryan further argued that after Delaney observed a safety violation, he was required
to first notify the architect who then determined whether or not a violation actually existed. The
clause in the contract relating to the owner's delayed right to terminate the work does not,
however, support Justice Ryan's contention that the architect is the final judge as to whether or
not a violation exists. See note 76 supra.
91. Id. at 506-07, 394 N.E.2d at 415 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 507, 394 N.E.2d at 415 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
93. See Emberton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 I11. 2d 111, 373 N.E.2d 1348
(1978) (emphasis added) (court stated that a person may be proven to be in charge of the work if
evidence demonstrates that the defendant either exercised actual control over or possessed the
right to control the construction); Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 33 I11. 2d 316, 211
N.E.2d 247 (1965) (a right to control the work whether exercised or not is sufficient to establish
that a defendant is in charge of the construction); accord, Scrimager v. Cabot Corp., 23 I11.
App. 3d 193, 318 N.E.2d 521 (4th Dist. 1974) (a person who has a duty under the statute
cannot escape liability by failing to exercise the control he has authority to exercise).
94. Id. at 508, 394 N.E.2d at 416 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
95. Id. In distinguishing the school district in Norton from the owner in Emberton, Justice
Ryan strongly implied that the owner in Emberton could stop the work. The architect in Emberton was the only person who had the authority to stop the work. The owner, however, was
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cluded that as a matter of law the evidence was insufficient to support the
jury's verdict in favor of Norton: the school district was not in charge of the
construction. 96
Although Justice Ryan offered more detailed reasoning than the majority, his
discussion failed to alleviate the vagueness of the "having charge of" language. The
dissenting justice, while reaching a different conclusion than than the majority,
unfortunately relied on the same precedent followed by the majority opinion.
Thus, Scaffold Act litigation would remain confused under Justice Ryan's approach
because he failed to alter the existing vague supreme court interpretation of
"having charge of."
RAMIFICATIONS

OF THE NORTON DECISION

Broad Definition Promotes Inconsistency
The Norton decision signals the Illinois Supreme Court's return to a very
liberal interpretation 97 of the Scaffold Act. This present posture is adopted
in the wake of the more restrictive approach of the mid-1970's. The Norton
court provided, aside from this liberal policy shift, however, little guidance
to direct lower courts in applying Structural Work Act law. Scaffold Act
cases therefore will continue to turn on arbitrary interpretations of particular
factual situations. The Illinois Supreme Court, by establishing the boundaries of an owner's "having charge of" as between something more than normal
ownership rights yet less than requiring actual supervision and control of the
construction, has inadvertently fostered inconsistent results in decisions of
the lower courts. With such a broad definition, a jury or an appellate court,
depending on its particular predilection, can justify almost any result and
still remain within the scope of the court-created definition of "having charge
of" the work. The disparity between the two supreme court opinions ren-

unable to terminate the construction. Emberton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 I11.
2d
at 122-24, 373 N.E.2d at 1352-53.
96. 76 Ill.
2d at 513, 394 N.E.2d at 418 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
97. The recent supreme court decision, Emberton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71
I1l. 2d 111, 373 N.E.2d 1398 (1978), also exhibits this liberal trend. Emberton modified the
restrictive language of Carruthers v. B.C. Christopher & Co., 57 Ill. 2d 376, 313 N.E.2d 457
(1974), and McGovern v. Standish, 65 III. 2d 54, 357 N.E.2d 1134 (1976), which required an
owner to be in charge of the particular operations which was a violation of the Act which caused
the injury before liability could be imposed. See note 49 and accompanying text supra. See also
Farley v. Marion Power Shovel, 60 Ill. 2d 432, 328 N.E.2d 318 (1975), and Tenenbaum v. City
of Chicago, 60 Ill. 2d 363, 325 N.E.2d 607 (1975). Both of these courts limited the scope of the
term structure and scaffold as provided in § 60 of the Scaffold Act. In Farley, the court held
that a mobile, self-propelled power shovel is not a structure within the meaning of the Scaffold
Act. Farley v. Marion Power Shovel, 60 I11.
2d at 437, 328 N.E.2d at 320. In Tenenbaum, the
court limited recovery to the hazardous nature of the device itself. Therefore, if someone trips
over a ladder and is injured, that worker cannot recover under the Scaffold Act. Tenenbaum v.
City of Chicago, 60 I11.
2d at 370-71, 325 N.E.2d at 613 (1975). For a discussion of these two
cases, see Note, Scope of Structural Work Act Liability, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 333.
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dered in Norton illustrates the dilemma created by the "having charge of"
language of the Scaffold Act. 98 The divergent results in the factually similar
Norton and McGovern 99 cases serve as a further example of this definitional

problem.
The Norton majority also underscored this definitional ambiguity by neglecting to overrule the restrictive language used by the supreme court in
McGovern. In Emberton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., 100 the Illinois Supreme Court partially had erased the restrictive effect
of the McGovern rule requiring a defendant's control over the particular
operations. 101

Yet the Emberton court's interpretation of the McGovern

rule is still inadequate. Under a liberal interpretation of the statutory "having charge of" language, a person deemed to be in charge of the overall
operation because of factors10 2 such as the right to supervise, 103 stop the
work, 104 fire and hire employees, 105 also will have the right to control all of
the particular operations under the project. The majority in Norton allowed
ambiguity to remain by reiterating the Emberton court's interpretation of
McGovern's rule. As a result, juries and appellate courts are given too much
latitude in interpreting the language addressing an owner's liability. 106

98. The definition of "having charge of" has become so broad through various supreme
court interpretations that the Norton court first was able to decide that the school district was
not in charge and then later hold that the school district was in charge of the work, and both
times stay within the definition of having charge.
99. 65 11. 2d 54, 357 N.E.2d at 1134 (1976). See notes 74-82 and accompanying text supra.
100. 71 Ill. 2d 111, 373 N.E.2d at 1348 (1978).
101. Id. at 114-15, 373 N.E.2d at 1350-51. The Emberton majority interpreted McGovern as
holding that in order to impose liability under the Scaffold Act, it must be shown that the
person was in charge of the particular operation which involved the violation from which the
injury arose either by proof that the defendant actually exercised control or that he had the
right to exercise authority over the operations. Id. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
102. For a discussion of the factors relevant to the issue of whether a defendant is in charge
of the work, see Ring, supra note 48, at 668-69; Strodel I1, supra note 42, at 629-30.
103. Kobus v. Formfit Co., 35 Ill. 2d 533, 221 N.E.2d 633 (1966) (right of supervision by
owner was one factor that created factual issue as to whether owner was in charge of work);
Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 33 I11.2d 316, 211 N.E.2d 247 (1965) (right to supervise,
although not conclusive, may be germane to issue of having charge of the construction);
Mclnerney v. Hasbrook Constr. Co., 16 I11. App. 3d 464, 326 N.E.2d 619 (1st Dist. 1974)
(owner's supervision over the construction indicated that owner was directly connected with
construction).
104. See note 88 supra.
105. Carlson v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 64 I11. App. 2d 331, 213 N.E.2d 129 (1965).
106. The court's diffuse definition of "having charge of" has increased the number of lawsuits
under the Act. Strodel II, supra note 42, at 638; see Comment, supra note 5, at 410. Scaffold
Act litigation involves a complex number of factual and legal issues and, as a result, great sums
of money are expended resolving them. Since outcomes in Scaffold Act litigation have varied, an
injured plaintiff often sues any person even remotely connected with the construction to increase his odds of recovery. See Comment, supra note 5, at 419. As a result of its vague
interpretation of "having charge of," the Illinois Supreme Court has encouraged a tremendous
amount of unnecessary, economically wasteful litigation.
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Liability of the Passive Wrongdoer
Justice Ryan expressed concern that the liberal statutory construction
adopted in Norton may allocate the entire burden of plaintiff's injury on a

passive tortfeasor who is only technically at fault. Prior to 1971, the school
district could have avoided liability simply by drafting a precise indemnity 107 agreement imposing all liability for construction-related injuries

upon the general contractor.

108

In 1971, however, the legislature passed a

statute voiding any contractual indemnity agreements as against public policy. 109 In Davis v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 110 the Illinois Supreme

Court interpreted this statute and held that indemnification agreements
under the Structural Work Act are void because they are against public policy. "I Thus, an owner, who is usually only passively negligent, can no
longer enter into a written indemnity agreement that shifts liability from the
owner to another who has more control over the construction, such as the
contractor.

Illinois appellate courts have allowed indemnification, however, under an
active-passive theory in Structural Work Act cases, even absent an express

agreement.

112

Under an active-passive theory of indemnification, an owner

held responsible under the Structural Work Act may maintain a third party
suit for indemnity as long as that owner is not guilty of active miscon-

duct. 113 Justice Ryan, however, stated in his Norton dissent, that "[]ogic
would seem to require that if it is against public policy to shift the burden of
a Structural Work Act violation by an express agreement it must also be
against public policy to do so by virtue of active-passive negligence." 114 He

107. Indemnity involves the shifting of liability from one held legally accountable to another.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 692 (5th ed. 1979).
108. See Strodel, The Structural Work Act 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 72, 84-95; Sorenson, Strategy
and Proof Under the Illinois Structural Work Act, 59 ILL. B.J. 550, 560 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Sorenson].
109. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 29, § 61 (1977).
110. 61 111. 2d 494, 336 N.E.2d 881 (1975).
111. Id. at 502, 336 N.E.2d at 886.
112. Mclnerney v. Hasbrook Constr. Co., 62 I11.
2d 93, 338 N.E.2d 868 (1975) (contractor
allowed indemnification from subcontractor); Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill.
2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630
(1967) (architect held liable under the statute was able to maintain third party indemnity action
against general contractor).
113. Mclnerney v. Hasbrook Constr. Co., 62 II. 2d at 104, 338 N.E.2d at 874; Miller v.
DeWitt, 37 11. 2d at 291, 226 N.E.2d at 641, where the court reasoned that persons "having charge
of" the work who willfully violates the statute are not necessarily active wrongdoers. In Rosencamp v. Central Constr. Co., 45 III. App. 2d 441, 195 N.E.2d 756 (1st Dist. 1964), the court
stated that a "lesser delinquent," held to be in charge of the work and thus liable for the
violations of the Act, may justifiably maintain an indemnity action against an "active delinquent." The court concluded that because neither tortfeasor could escape liability to the plaintiff, the purpose of the Act is achieved. Id. at 449, 195 N.E.2d at 760.
114. 76 II1. 2d at 512, 394 N.E.2d at 418 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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noted that neither the legislature nor the Davis court limited their prohibition of indemnity agreements to those who were actively negligent. 115
Justice Ryan is correct that if the court is going to apply such a liberal
construction of the phrase "having charge of," then the court must continue
to allow active-passive indemnity. If the court precludes active-passive indemnity in Scaffold Act cases, an active wrongdoer often will be shielded
from liability while an owner who is only technically at fault will bear the
entire burden of plaintiff injury.
Workable Standard for the Future
In its attempt to achieve a laudable goal the Illinois Supreme Court has
created a confusing, overbroad civil remedy for injured workmen. The Illinois Legislature should revise the statute so as to define more precisely its
terms, 116 for throughout the Act's history the Illinois Supreme Court has
unsuccessfully tried to establish a workable definition for "having charge of"
the work. If the legislature intends the statute to apply liberally as to owners, then the legislature should eliminate the "having charge" requirement
before liability can be imposed upon willful violators of the Act. Alternatively, if the legislature desires to narrow the scope of the statute, then it
should clarify "having charge of" as necessitating direct control over the particular work being done.
This legislative action is necessary because the Illinois Supreme Court has
been unsuccessful in maintaining consistent application of the statute as to
civil liability. 117 The court has provided a liberal interpretation of the "having charge of"' language to promote its commendable policy goal of protecting
workmen engaged in hazardous construction. 118 The enactment of the

115. Id. at 511, 394 N.E.2d at 417. A major distinction exists, however, between an indemnity action based on an express agreement and an indemnity suit based on an active-passive
theory. Under an express contract of indemnity an active tortfeasor could escape liability because no fault weighing is involved. See Strodel II, supra note 42, at 635; see also Sorenson,
supra note 108, at 560. On the other hand, an active-passive theory of indemnity allows recovery only to passive tortfeasors against active wrongdoers. Liability under third party activepassive indemnity suits is a factual issue which is decided by a jury. Mclnerney v. Hasbrook
Constr. Co., 62 Ill. 2d at 104, 338 N.E.2d at 873 (1975); Isabelli v. Cowles Chem. Co., 7 111.
App. 3d 888, 899, 289 N.E.2d 12, 20 (1st Dist. 1972). The legislature's and Davis court's prohibition against express indemnity agreements could be reasonably interpreted as only prohibiting express agreements of indemnification. Justice Ryan assumes too much when he argues that
the legislature's and supreme court's prohibition against express agreements of indemnity also
precludes suits brought under an active-passive theory.
116. The New York Legislature redefined its Scaffold Act to place a nondelegable duty "upon
all contractors and owners and their agents." Comment, supra note 5, at 422. The author also
notes, however, that several attempts by the Illinois Legislature to more clearly define "having
charge of" tinder the Scaffold Act has been unsuccessful. Id.
117. For a discussion of the various supreme court interpretations of "having charge of," see
notes 32-54 and accompanying text supra.
118. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
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Workmen's Compensation Act 1 9 has given the court further incentive for
liberal construction of the phrase. Section 138.5 120 of the Workmen's Compensation Act precludes injured employees from suing their employers and
thereby encourages litigation against owners and architects in Scaffold Act
cases. At the same time, owners and architects can only be held liable under
a liberal interpretation of the Scaffold Act. 121 Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court has rendered this liberal interpretation in order to provide an
injured workman a common law remedy. It is unlikely, however, that the
Illinois Legislature that originally passed the statute anticipated liability extending to owners such as the school district in Norton. 122
The supreme court, in light of its failure to provide proper guidance in
defining liability under the Act, should adopt one of two workable definitions. One interpretation would place a nondelegable duty upon owners
under the Act. Because the present wording of the statute does not allow
such an interpretation, 123 this would require legislative action. The only
other solution is for the court to require direct control and supervision over

119. Because the Workmen's Compensation statute prevents an injured employee from suing
his employer and a restrictive interpretation of "having charge of" would absolve owners and
architects, the injured employee would be left with the compensation from his employer provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act as his sole remedy. One author states that the
amount recoverable under the Workmen's Compensation Act is much smaller than the damages
potentially recoverable at common law. Comment, The Supervising Architect: His Liabilities
and His Remedies when a Worker Is Injured, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 535, 536 (1969). The commentator notes that such noneconomic losses of pain and suffering, which are recoverable at common law, are not compensable under the Act. He further states that damages recoverable tinder
Workmen's Compensation statutes "are computed by multiplying the estimated loss of earning
power by a fixed percentage." The sum is further limited because Workmen's Compensation
Acts usually set "weekly or monthly maximums beyond which the percentage of lost earnings
cannot be recovered. There is also a maximum length of time for which lost earning power can
be compensated." Id. Another commentator states that "Scaffold Act plaintiffs recover full common law damages, including pain and suffering and all out of pocket losses." Comment, supra
note 5, at 412. He further notes that in Scully v. Otis Elevator Co., 2 II1. App. 3d 185, 275
N.E.2d 905 (1st Dist. 1971), the plaintiff recovered $600,000 for the death of her husband
which was more than 25 times greater than the maximum workman compensation benefits she
was allowed to receive. Id.
120. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 138.5, § 5(a) (1977).
121. Owners and architects usually don't control the particular details of the work that causes
the injury. Thus, a liberal interpretation of "having charge of" is necessary for owners and
architects to be held liable under § 69 of the Scaffold Act. See note 49 supra.
122. The year the Scaffold Act was instituted an injured employee was able to sue his
employer. Four years later, the Workmen's Compensation Act was passed which prohibited an
employee from suing both his employer and third party tortfeasors. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, §
166 (1913). Scaffold Act litigation was held in virtual abeyance until 1952 when the Illinois
Supreme Court held as unconstitutional section 29 of the Workmen's Compensation Act which
prohibited injured employees from suing third party tortfeasors. Grasse v. Dealer's Transp. Co.,
412 II1. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952).
123. See the discussion of Gannon v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. Ry. Co., notes
34-37 and accompanying text supra.
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the work being done before liability is imposed. 124 Unless the court adopts
this latter approach, inconsistency will continue to characterize Scaffold Act
law.
CONCLUSION

Since the early 1960's, the Illinois Supreme Court has unsuccessfuly tried
to straddle the definition of "having charge of" between requiring a direct
connection with the work but not actual supervision and control. Unfortunately, the Norton decision still leaves the definition of "having charge of" between these two extremes. The favorable policy goal of providing safe working conditions for construction projects is worthy, 125 but such a policy does
not justify the arbitrary interpretations of a vague statute by Illinois courts in
order to impose liability in cases such as Norton. Because the Illinois Scaffold Act does not as presently worded impose a nondelegable duty upon the
owner, the supreme court should require that the owner exercise direct control and supervision over the work before it imposes liability. Because the
Scaffold Act's unclear "having charge of" language encourages inconsistent
results, the best solution would be for the legislature to revise or repeal the
statute.
William H. Anger

124. This approach would eliminate the inconsistent results that have plagued Scaffold Act
litigation in the past. This interpretation would more clearly reflect the legislature's intention for
"having charge of" when the statute was enacted.
125. For a discussion of the necessity of drafting this policy goal into the state's laws, see Philo,
Revoke the Legal License to Kill Construction Workers, 19 DEPAUL L. REv 1 (1969).

